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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
pli!._iP hAKi- riULLbN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20000585-SC 
BRIFF uh APPti 1 M 
JURISfMt IK I •i • t 
Defendant appeals froi 11 U VV/1IY1VUVJ11 on two counts ui a^ ffra* ted robber 
first degree felony, in \ i< >lation of UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-6-302 (1994), in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Moi tennis Frederick, presiding. 
urisdicti 
L:^Lhb ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS nv R E \ r T r w 
.•Jeiidaiit's 
eXp.ert witness to testify to factors that could have affected the trliabilit • ol ihr 
1 
eyewitness identifications in this case, but refused to allow him to offer his opinion 
about whether the identifications were reliable? 
"The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not reverse unless the decision 
exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 136] (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). 
2. Were the eyewitness identifications "constitutionally reliable" and their 
admission consistent with the due process guarantees of the Utah Constitution? 
"The constitutionality of an identification procedure is a mixed question of 
law and fact." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). "[Tjrial courts have a measure of discretion to 
determine whether eyewitness identifications are reliable." Id. at 1236. Review is 
"less than de novo" because "whether an eyewitness identification is reliable under 
the totality of the circumstances is highly fact dependant, and the fact patterns are 
quite variable." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "On the other 
hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
[reliability of eyewitness identifications] are served." Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, i,"Ni) 111! "I  I , 
.The :.i :>s , _ . , 
i addendum i V. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1994) 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
UtahR. Evid. 702 
Utah R. Evid, ~r-i 
SI U'FMI Mil Oil' l\\V ( "In '• ill" 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery' in connection 
with a July 16, 1995 robbery at Raging Waters in Salt L ake Count v . \e 
trial court conducted , 
I'm ' rrmvirted defend *•" »oui charges, and thw mm judee sentenced det 
immediately following the verdict R 259-261, 3 P : 2 7 4 , 277-288 Defendant filed 
a motion for a new trial on March 3, I'WN K, JbS-JW). Un Ma> Jo, J1 " lie Iru' 
en- _ • .• 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Oscar Contreras had just completed Ins naming .ir«i i hlcjiuard al Kagiiiiu 
-o-37. He arrived early on Sunday, July 16, 
x^-, , his first day on duty, and p..__. -is car. ."/ jr "" \s he exited the * ehk!< 
two men wearing clothing similar to lifeguard attire approached ;,... 
One was heavy v.. .. . ^ 
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disguised. Id. Defendant, the heavy set man, wore a hat, sunglasses, and a fake 
moustache. Id. at 107-108. He pulled a gun and said, "Don't do anything stupid. 
This is a robbery. Where do you guys h[o]ld the money?" Id. at 41-42. 
Oscar had no idea where the money was kept, but proceeded with the men to 
the building where employees reported for work. Id. at 41-43. As they approached 
the building, they saw Lou Livolsi, the manager, and Channing Jones, the operations 
manager. Id. at 43, 154. 
Oscar told the men that Lou was the manager. Defendant showed Lou his 
gun and again said, "[T]his is a robbery. We don't want you to do anything stupid." 
Id. at 43-46, 108. He then asked Lou where the money was kept. Id. at 108. Lou 
told him it was in the safe, but that he didn't have a key. Lou sent Dave Peterson, 
another lifeguard, to get Jill Pittman Roberts, the cash control manager, who did 
have a key. Id. at 109. 
After Dave got Jill, the group continued to the building where the money was 
kept. They knocked on the door, and Janea Seager Jones, an employee in cash 
control, let them in. Id. at 84, 134. The cash control office was divided into two 
rooms—an approximately three by nine foot entry room, where money was counted, 
and a rear locked vault. Id. at 84-86, 134. Jill opened the vault, and Lou and Jill 
helped defendant fill two gym bags with $25,000 to $28,000 in currency. Id. at 
112-13, 137-138. 
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Meanwhile, defendant's accomplice wire-tied (flex-cuffed) the other 
employees' hands behind their backs and duct-taped their mouths. Id. at 113, 176. 
When the bags were filled, defendant asked for Lou's car keys. Id. at 114. Because 
Lou didn't have them, defendant asked for and received Oscar's car keys. Id. The 
accomplice went out to get Oscar's car and drove it into the Raging Waters 
compound close to the cash control door. Id. Defendant and his accomplice then 
wire-tied and duct-taped Lou and Jill, told everyone to wait ten minutes before they 
did anything, and went out the back door. Id. at 115, 138. 
As soon as the door shut, two employees managed to dial 911 and the other 
employees began helping one another remove their ties and duct tape. Id. at 94, 
115. The police arrived within minutes. Id. at 94. While the on-site investigation 
was still in progress, authorities located Oscar's car a few blocks away. Id. at 53. 
Later that day Channing helped Detective Ray Dalling prepare computer-
generated composites of the robbers. Id. at 173-174. Oscar, Lou, and Jill all saw 
the composites. Id. at 57, 120-121, 142.1 Detective Dalling also prepared a photo 
spread using six pictures from police files. Id. at 180. 
About two months after the robbery, Channing saw defendant on television 
and called Detective Dalling. Id. at 164-165. Detective Dalling then asked 
Channing to come in to view the photo spread, and Channing identified defendant 
1
 Oscar apparently also helped prepare the composites. See R. 315:47. 
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Id. at 178-79. A few days later, Detective Dalling had Oscar come in, and Oscar 
also identified defendant. Id. at 179-180. Prior to their identifications, Detective 
Dalling told both Channing and Oscar that the person who robbed them might or 
might not be pictured. Id. at 184. 
Oscar, Jill, Lou, Janea, and David viewed an October 17, 1997 lineup at the 
Salt Lake County Jail. State's Exhibit 27. Defendant was number six of six lineup 
participants. Id. Oscar and Jill identified defendant as the individual involved in 
the Raging Waters crime. Id. Lou wrote that he was "pretty sure, but not definite" 
that number six was the robber. Id. Janea indicated that she was not sure, but 
thought number three was the individual. David marked his form "3 or 6[,] 
probably 3." Id. Oscar, Jill, Lou, and Janea testified about their lineup 
identifications at trial. R. 116:62, 96, 119, 144-145. David was unavailable, and 
the parties stipulated that the court reporter present at the lineup would testify to the 
content of David's identification. R. 317:196. 
Oscar, Lou, Jill, and Channing also identified defendant at trial. R. 316:64, 
119, 145, 166. Oscar testified that he had viewed defendant at a very close distance 
at several junctures during the crime. Id. at 41, 45-46, 66. Lou, Jill, and Channing 
also testified to viewing defendant both at close range and in full sun. Id. at 113, 
117, 122, 123, 129, 136, 156. 
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Defendant called David Dodd, Ph.D., a University of Utah psychologist, to 
present expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. Dr. Dodd 
testified that it was more difficult to identify an individual after a single, short 
viewing than after repeated exposures. R. 317:204. He also testified that disguises, 
distraction (by a weapon), fear, and stress interfere with the accurate acquisition of 
information. Id. at 204-208. He stated that the passage of time interferes with 
retention of information. Id. at 209. He also said that suggestion may interfere with 
retention—that viewing composites or photographs may affect memory. Id. at 209. 
He further testified that suggestion may affect the retrieval of identification 
information. Id. at 210. If, for instance, a witness believes that an individual will 
be in a lineup, the witness will be more likely to pick one of the lineup participants 
than he would be if he were uncertain that the individual would be in the lineup. Id. 
Dr. Dodd also testified that he gave ten mock witnesses the physical 
description of the perpetrator in this case and then showed them the photo spread. 
Id. at 211-212. He stated that, based on this description, the mock witnesses chose 
only three of the six photographs. Id. at 212. He therefore concluded that the 
"functional equivalent of this [photo spread] was three," suggesting that the photo 
spread contained only three meaningful choices, not six. Id. at 213. He testified 
that a witness who took three minutes to make a selection from a photo array might 
be less reliable than a witness who responded more quickly, but conceded on cross-
7 
examination that reliability depended on what the witness was thinking during that 
period. Id. at 215, 224-225. He also stated that the correlation between accuracy 
and confidence is minimal. Id. at 216. 
Defense counsel then asked Dr. Dodd if he had "an opinion as to whether the 
process of identification in this case raise[d] serious questions as to [its] reliability." 
Id. at 216. The prosecutor objected, and the court sustained the objection, stating 
that this was "within the province of the jury." Id. The court also denied defense 
counsel's request to argue the objection outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 217. 
The trial court gave the jury a lengthy cautionary instruction on eyewitness 
identification based on State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 n.8 (Utah 1986). R. 249-
251. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly excluded the expert's opinion on the reliability of the 
victims' eyewitness identification. While the admission of that testimony may have 
been permissible under the evidence rules, it was not mandatory. The trial judge did 
not abuse his discretion in excluding that information where it may not have assisted 
the trier of fact and where it may have been more prejudicial than probative, 
confusing or misleading to the jury, and needlessly cumulative. 
The trial court also properly determined that the eyewitness testimony was 
constitutionally reliable and therefore could be presented to the jury. Applying the 
8 
analysis set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991), the court 
considered the relevant factors to determine that "under the totality of the 
circumstances," the identifications were reliable. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The trial court properly excluded the expert's conclusory opinion 
on the reliability of the eyewitness identification. The court applied 
the appropriate legal factors. Any error was harmless. 
Defendant argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he refused to 
allow the expert witness to testify about the reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications in this case. Br. Aplt. at 24. Defendant argues that the judge abused 
his discretion because (1) he misapplied the evidence rules that permit expert 
testimony on this matter, and (2) he was hostile toward expert identification 
evidence. Id. at 25-26, 31. Finally, defendant argues that the refusal to allow this 
testimony was harmful. Id. at 34. 
A. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude the expert's 
conclusory opinion on the reliability of the eyewitness identification. 
Defendant apparently argues that because rules 702 and 704 permit expert 
testimony on an "ultimate issue," they therefore require its admission. See Br. Aplt. 
at 27-28. That argument misstates the reach of the rules on expert testimony. 
Further, the argument disregards the interplay between these rules and other rules 
governing admissibility of evidence. A court's inquiry into the admissibility of 
9 
evidence under rules 702 and 704 is the beginning, not the end, of its inquiry into 
whether the evidence should be admitted. 
Trial courts have wide discretion to determine the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and their decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). This Court "will not reverse unless the 
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Id. 
The relevant evidence rules in this case are rules 403, 702, and 704. Rule 702 
states that an expert may testify if his testimony will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence. Rule 704 provides that testimony, otherwise admissible, is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact. These expert testimony rules must be read in conjunction with the general 
relevancy requirements of rules 401-403, especially the provisions of rule 403 that 
permit the exclusion of relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury" or when it is needlessly cumulative. 
"[R]ule 704 does not make expert testimony admissible simply because it 
expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362 
(emphasis in original). Rather, that testimony is admissible if the trial judge, in the 
exercise of his discretion, determines that (1) the testimony will assist the trier of 
fact "to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," (2) its probative 
10 
value is greater than "the danger of unfair prejudice [and] confusion," and (3) it is 
not needlessly cumulative. Utah R. Evid. 702, 403. 
Defendant's cites Larsen to support his argument that the trial court erred 
when it excluded the expert's conclusory opinion on the reliability of the victim's 
eyewitness identifications. Larsen does not support defendant's argument. 
In Larsen, unlike the instant case, the defendant challenged the admission, not 
the exclusion, of expert testimony. Larsen argued that expert testimony was not 
"helpful" under rule 702 because "it transgressed into the area reserved for the 
jury." 865P.2dat 1361. 
Before addressing the rule 702 "helpfulness" issue, the Larsen court observed 
that "rule 704 does not make expert testimony inadmissible simply because it 
expresses an opinion on the ultimate issue." Id. at 1362 (emphasis in original). The 
court also observed, however, that "[R]ule 704 does not make expert testimony 
admissible simply because it expresses an opinion regarding an ultimate issue." Id. 
(emphasis in original). The Court held that rule 704 "permits" an expert "to express 
an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue as long as that 
testimony is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence" Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Under the circumstances in Larsen, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in permitting the expert's testimony. The reviewing court observed, however, "We 
do not suggest that the trial court must allow expert testimony [on an ultimate 
11 
issue]. We simply hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
the limited testimony in this case." Id. at 1363 n.12. 
As Larsen makes clear, a trial court may properly exercise its discretion to 
exclude expert testimony, including testimony on an ultimate issue. It may find that 
expert eyewitness testimony is not helpful and is, in fact, prejudicial because the 
aura of reliability and trustworthiness surrounding the expert's testimony poses a 
substantial risk of interfering with the jury's role as fact-finder. See United States v. 
Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 
383 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 636-637 (M.D. Pa. 
1975), aff'd mem., 523 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1975); see also United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (observing that trial court should 
exercise its discretion to balance the reliability of expert eyewitness testimony 
against the likelihood that the testimony would overwhelm and mislead the jury). 
Exclusion is particularly appropriate where the expert has had no contact with 
the witnesses or with the defendant, and his only knowledge of the case comes from 
his reading of police reports and his discussions with defense counsel. The trial 
court may therefore conclude that the minimal probative value of the expert's 
testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury may attach too 
much weight to the expert's aura of reliability. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 
461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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The court may also determine, in the exercise of its discretion, that an 
eyewitness expert's proffered evidence is confusing or needlessly cumulative. See 
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rincon, 28 
F.3d 921, 923-926 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Except in rare instances, appellate courts do not disturb trial court rulings 
either admitting or excluding evidence. "[I]n reviewing a trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude evidence, we allow for broad discretion." State v. Eberwein, 2001 
UT App 71,111, 21 P.3d 1139 (admitting evidence); see also State v. Payne, 964 
P.2d 327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (excluding evidence). This deference reflects the 
superior opportunity of the trial judge to gauge the extent to which the expert's 
testimony would be helpful to the jury. 
In this case, the trial court's exclusion was very carefully limited. The court 
permitted the expert to testify to a wide range of factors affecting the reliability of 
eyewitnesses. R. 317:204-210. The court also allowed him to testify about how 
evidence specific to this case—defendant's disguise, one of the witness's having 
been "scared to death," the composition of the photo spread, and the time spent by 
one witness to pick a photo from the photo spread—may have affected the 
reliability of eye witness identifications. Id. at 205, 208, 211-213.2 The court 
2In addition to the admitted expert testimony, defendant's cross-examination of 
State witnesses and closing arguments addressed the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications. See State v. Payne, 964 P.2d at 332 (upholding exclusion of expert 
(continued...) 
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excluded only the expert's testimony on the conclusory question, "[D]o you have an 
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious 
questions as to [its] reliability?" The court ruled that this matter was "within the 
province of the jury." Id. at 317:216. 
Defendant asserts alternatively that the trial court misapplied the law because 
it stated that the expert's testimony on this matter was "within the province of the 
jury." Br. Aplt. at 26; R. 317:216. Defendant apparently argues that the trial court 
did not exercise its discretion, but rather misapprehended the evidentiary rules or 
other law to prohibit any testimony on ultimate issues. 
Defendant construes this cursory phrase to make his argument. Nothing 
suggests that the trial court felt itself bound to preclude the expert's testimony; 
rather, when the prosecution objected, the court agreed that the testimony could and 
should be excluded. The trial court most likely intended the phrase to convey its 
determination that the expert's response to defense counsel's summary question in 
this case posed a substantial risk of interfering with the jury's role as fact finder. 
Balancing the probative value of expert eyewitness testimony against the 
likelihood that the testimony would overwhelm and mislead the jury, the trial court 
determined that the expert's conclusory opinion should be excluded. The decision 
2(... continued) 
testimony and noting that "jury could reasonably [have been] expected to appreciate 
[certain] concerns, which were called to its attention through cross-examination and 
closing argument, without the assistance of expert testimony." 
14 
to exclude was a reasonable decision within the wide discretion trial courts have to 
determine the admissibility of expert testimony. 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial judge failed to consider 
pertinent facts or misapprehended the law when he sustained the 
prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's conclusory question. 
Defendant argues that the trial judge's personal reservations about the value of 
eyewitness identification testimony caused him to exclude the expert's testimony. 
He asserts that the trial court "repudiated]" the law and disregarded the jury's need 
for assistance. See Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Defendant argues that the trial judge thus 
failed to exercise a fully informed discretion. Id. at 32. 
Defendant has pointed to no cases suggesting that the trial court must 
articulate every basis upon which it exercises its discretion and that, failing to do so, 
an appellate court may presume the failure to make "a fully informed decision." Id. 
The authority defendant cites is, in fact, so tangentially relevant to the facts of this 
case as to be more confusing than helpful. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 646 
(Utah 1980) (holding that a parent's manifestation of her sexuality and resulting 
behavior patterns are relevant to a determination of visitation rights and that trial 
court's failure to consider them made impossible a fully informed exercise of 
discretion); West Valley City v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, fflf 12, 14, 981 P.2d 420 
(holding that trial judge's precipitous declaration of a mistrial without considering 
less drastic alternatives constituted an abuse of discretion and that retrial violated ex 
post facto protections) (both cases cited in Br. Aplt. at 31). 
15 
Further, nothing suggests that the trial judge "repudiated the well-established 
law" on eyewitness identification. Br. Aplt. at 32. The trial judge both permitted 
the eyewitness expert to testify and gave a jury instruction following the pattern set 
forth in Long, 721 P.2d at 483. R. 249-251, 316:9. 
Defendant argues that the trial judge "repudiated the well-established law" 
when, at the evidentiary hearing, he stated that (1) from an "untrained eye 
perspective" the photo spread was "a pretty good conglomeration of individuals 
[with] similar characteristics" and (2) "[t]he testimony of Dr. Dodd was of little or 
no circumstance to me." Br. Aplt. at 32; R. 315:106. 
The trial judge did not repudiate well-established law; rather, he acted in 
accordance with law to fulfill his "gatekeeping" responsibilities. When a defendant 
challenges the constitutional admissibility of evidence, the defendant is entitled to a 
determination by the court of the evidence's constitutional admissibility. See 
Ramirez at 778 (holding that trial court has "charge as gatekeeper to carefully 
scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects"); State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 
940, 944 (Utah App. 1997) (stating that trial court cannot sidestep "its gatekeeping 
responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification testimony"). 
Here, after defendant moved to suppress the eyewitness identification 
testimony, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
evidence was constitutionally unreliable. R. 190-191, 315. He received from the 
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eyewitnesses the testimony they would offer at trial. R. 315:24-87. He also heard 
the testimony of defendant's expert about factors that undermine the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony. Id. at 87-102. He then determined that the proffered 
eyewitness testimony was sufficiently reliable to present to the jury. Id. at 106. 
In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge had to determine whether the photo 
spread identification had been suggestive and whether the eyewitness identifications 
were a product of suggestion. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783-784. He determined 
from "an untrained eye perspective," in other words, from his perspective as a 
judge, that it was not. He was not required to adopt the position of the expert, but 
to hear all the evidence and then make a judicial determination. His statement that 
the expert's testimony was "of little or no circumstance to me" was merely his 
expression that the expert testimony had not convinced him that the eyewitness 
testimony proffered was constitutionally unreliable. 
Defendant also bristles at the trial judge's statement that the expert's 
testimony would not be "revolutionary" and would "shed light on issues that I 
assumed before the Long case were common knowledge." Br. Aplt. at 32; 
R. 316:8-9. The trial judge made these statements in the context of his ruling, over 
the prosecution's objection, that the expert could testify. The statements helped 
explain why the prosecution would not be unfairly surprised by the expert's 
testimony even though the prosecution had not received the expert's name as a 
proposed witness at trial. R. 316:7-9. Defendant's argument that these statements 
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constituted a "repudiation of] the well established law and research on eyewitness 
identification" is meritless. Br. Aplt. at 32. 
C Refusal to permit a response to the defendant's conclusory question on 
the reliability of eyewitness testimony in this case was harmless. 
Defendant argues that he was "severely harmed" by the trial court's refusal to 
permit the expert to offer an opinion "as to whether the process of identification in 
this case raise[d] serious questions as to [its] reliability." Br. Aplt. at 34; 
R. 317:216. 
Defendant was not harmed. Error in excluding evidence is not harmful unless 
"absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to 
the defendant." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 697 (Utah App. 1995). 
No reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have returned a different 
verdict, had Dr. Dodd been allowed to respond to defendant's conclusory question. 
Dr. Dodd was permitted to testify to factors that can make eyewitness testimony 
unreliable and to testify to those factors in the context of the evidence specific to 
this case, i.e., defendant's disguise, one witness's fear, the composition of the photo 
spread, and a witness's three or four minute study before picking a photo from the 
photo spread. R. 317:205, 208, 211-213. The jurors had before them the expert's 
testimony that eyewitness identifications can be unreliable and that the factors 
undermining reliability were present in this case. Further, the court had given the 
jurors a Long cautionary instruction on eyewitness identifications. R. 249-251; see 
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721 P.2d at 494 n.8. The expert's conclusory opinion that the process of eyewitness 
identification in this case raised serious reliability questions would have added 
nothing more. Knowing that eyewitness identifications can be unreliable and 
knowing that some of the factors undermining reliability may have been present 
here, the jury nevertheless concluded that the eyewitness identifications in this case 
established "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defendant was the perpetrator of this 
crime. The expert's conclusory opinion would have made no difference. 
Point II 
After scrutinizing the proffered eyewitness testimony for constitutional defects, 
the trial court made a proper preliminary determination that the eyewitness 
identifications were sufficiently reliable for presentation to the jury. 
Defendant argues that the eyewitness identifications by Oscar Contreras, 
Channing Jones, Lou Livolsi, and Jill Pittman Roberts were constitutionally 
unreliable and that the trial judge erred when he denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. Br. Aplt. at 36, 38-46. 
The trial judge did not err. Rather, he held an evidentiary hearing and 
carefully scrutinized the proffered eyewitness testimony for constitutional defects. 
R. 315:1, 103-106. After considering the legally relevant factors, he applied the 
appropriate legal standard to determine that the identifications were constitutionally 
reliable. Id. at 103-106. 
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The appropriate legal standard is "whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, [an] identification was reliable." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. The 
pertinent factors to be considered are these: 
(1) "[t]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness could perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. 
Id. No one factor is, by itself, determinative. For instance, even though a pretrial 
identification procedure may be impermissibly suggestive, that factor alone is not 
dispositive. The question remains "whether under the totality of the circumstances 
the identification was reliable." Perry, 899 P.2d at 1238 (affirming conviction 
despite "unduly suggestive" showup); see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 (holding 
that testimony warranted a preliminary determination of reliability despite? 
"blatant[ly] suggestive[]" showup). 
On review, this Court affords the trial court "a measure of discretion to 
determine whether eyewitness identifications are reliable." Perry, 899 P.2d at 1236. 
While the constitutionality of an identification procedure is a mixed question of law 
and fact, review is "less than de novo" because the identifications involve varied 
fact patterns and "reliability] under the totality of the circumstances is highly fact 
dependant." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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A. Applying the Ramirez standard, the trial judge properly determined that 
the eyewitness testimony was sufficiently reliable for presentation to the 
jury. 
The trial court judge, looking at the "totality of the circumstances," 
determined that the eyewitness identifications were constitutionally reliable and 
should be presented to the jury. See R. 315:107. He based this conclusion on the 
factors outlined in Ramirez. Id. at 103-106. 
1. Opportunity to view 
The trial court observed that all the witnesses had an opportunity to view the 
actor in sunlight or in a well-lit office. Id. at 103. Their distances from the actor 
varied, both over the course of an individual eyewitness's interaction with the actor 
and among the four eyewitnesses, from thirty yards down to one or two feet. Id. 
Each witness, however, had an opportunity for face-to-face or close contact 
observation for a period ranging from three or four minutes to a period of ten 
minutes or more. Id. at 104. 
The opportunity to view compares favorably to that in Ramirez, where the 
court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting an eyewitness 
i 
identification. See 817 P.2d at 784. The Ramirez eyewitness viewed a crouching 
gunman, wearing "a white scarf covering most of his face," at a distance of about 
ten to thirty feet for a very short period—variously stated by the witness to be "a 
second," a "few seconds," and "a minute" or longer. Id. at 776, 782. The witness 
was unable to see the masked lower portion of gunman's face. Id. at 782. He could 
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not see the gunman's eyes clearly, although he could see that the gunman had small 
eyes. Id. The Ramirez witnesses described the lighting at the crime scene as good, 
but they also described it as poor and stated that the gunman was in a shadowy area. 
Id. at 783. 
2. Degree of attention. 
The trial judge also determined that the witnesses' attention was focused once 
the gun was shown and they became aware of the actor's intent to commit a 
robbery. R. 315:105. Moreover, once the gun had been shown, little or no further 
distraction occurred, and the eyewitnesses' attention was "riveted on the 
identification of [the robbers]." Id. at 103. 
The degree of attention is similar to that in Ramirez where the eyewitness was 
also "fully aware that a robbery was taking place." 817 P.2d at 783. 
3. Capacity to observe 
The judge found that none of the witnesses' capacity to observe was impaired. 
While they were frightened to a greater or lesser degree, their fright "did not 
interfere with their ability and their capacity to observe and identify." R. 315:104. 
Further, nothing suggested that they were biased or prejudiced, fatigued, or under 
the influence or drugs or alcohol. Id. They "obviously ha[d] the mental acuity to 
understand what was going on." Id. at 105. 
Again, the comparison with Ramirez is favorable. The eyewitnesses here had 
a greater capacity to observe than the Ramirez eyewitness. Like the Ramirez 
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eyewitness, these eyewitnesses were subject to a heightened degree of stress and 
fear because of a gun. Unlike the Ramirez witness, however, none of these 
witnesses had been hurt, participated in a struggle, or heard one robber tell another 
to kill them if they moved again. 817 P.2d at 776, 783. 
4. Spontaneity, consistency, and lack of suggestion 
The judge found the identifications remarkably consistent over time. 
R. 315:105. He found that the eyewitnesses had no meaningful exposure to other 
opinions "at least until after the lineup." Id. He found that the photo array was 
"not so impermissible and suggestive that it would give rise to a substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 106. 
When evaluating a pretrial photo identification procedure for suggestiveness, 
"the main question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's photo 
over others." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994). Some factors to be 
considered include whether the police officers "manipulated the photos to indicate 
that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator" and "whether the photos 
themselves were selected so that the defendant's photo stood out from the rest." Id. 
Officer Dalling, who prepared the photo spread from pictures in the police 
file, testified that he selected the photos "because of the age range, the shape of the 
chin, the shape of the head, the basic features of each one were similar." R. 315:10. 
His goal was to give a "fair representation" so that defendant did not "stand out 
from anyone else." Id. He explained to both Channing and Oscar that the 
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perpetrator might not be included in the photo spread, then "handed" them the 
photos for their examination. Id. at 11, 13. Nothing suggests, nor does defendant 
claim, that Detective Dalling either selected or manipulated the photos to emphasize 
defendant. 
Here, unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness identification occurred months after the 
crime. However, the intervening photo spread was minimally suggestive, if 
suggestive at all. In Ramirez, by contrast, the eyewitness identification followed a 
"blatant[ly] suggestive[]" showup, where the defendant, the only person presented to 
the eyewitness, was shown handcuffed to a chain link fence illuminated in the night 
by police headlights. 817 P.2d at 784. 
5. Nature of the event 
The trial judge observed that the nature of the event, i.e., a robbery, served to 
focus the attention of the victims on the activities around them. R. 315:105. Again, 
this event was, like the Ramirez event, a robbery. 
B. The testimony of the individual witnesses supports the trial court's 
findings and its legal determination. 
Testimony offered by each eyewitness supports the trial court's determination 
that the eyewitness testimony was reliable under Ramirez. 
1. Oscar Contreras 
Oscar had an adequate opportunity to view defendant. He was with defendant 
for an extended period from the time when defendant approached him as he parked 
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his car until defendant left the premises with the money. He spent about ten 
minutes with him before he had to face the wall. R. 315: 57. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Oscar described defendant's physical build, his 
hair color and texture, and dress. Id. at 42-43, 53. He knew, from their first 
exchange, that a robbery was in progress. Id. at 43. He saw defendant in full sun at 
close range, from a distance of about two feet during the initial conversation. Id. at 
45. While defendant spoke with Lou, Oscar again had "plenty of opportunity" to 
observe him, "pretty much [from] the side." Id. at 46. 
Oscar helped prepare a composite drawing of defendant, participated in the 
photo array,3 and identified defendant at the lineup and at the preliminary hearing. 
Id. at 47-49. 
2. Channing Jones 
Channing Jones was with defendant from the time he entered the water park 
until he left with the money. He first saw him approaching from a distance of thirty 
yards, but later observed him from close range—at about five feet for at least a 
3The record reflects some minor inconsistencies regarding Oscar's photo spread 
identification. Oscar stated at the evidentiary hearing that he picked a photo from the 
photo spread. R. 315:48. He testified at trial that he believed that he picked someone 
from the photographs. R. 316:58. Detective Dalling testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that Oscar selected two photos—defendant's and a filler. R. 315:14. He testified at trial 
that Oscar made an identification and endorsed the back. R. 316:180. Detective 
Dalling's apparent inconsistencies may have been the result of Oscar's inability to 
identify defendant's co-perpetrator, a fact elicited on cross-examination at both 
proceedings. R. 315:55, 316:85. 
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couple of minutes. Id. at 25, 27-28. He observed defendant's build, his dress, his 
fake moustache, his sunglasses, and his face in full light. Id. He observed 
defendant both before and after he understood defendant's intent to rob. He also 
observed defendant, albeit from the corner of his eye, while he was facing the wall 
in the vault room. 
Channing helped prepare the composite sketch. Id. at 30. Charming also saw 
defendant later that year on television after he was arrested for another robbery. Id. 
at 31. He called Detective Dalling the following day. Id. at 31-32. He later viewed 
the photo spread and identified defendant as the perpetrator. Id. at 12, 32-33. 
3. Lou Livolsi 
Lou first observed defendant approaching him from a distance of twenty or 
thirty feet. R. 315:73. He observed defendant's attire, general build, and fake 
moustache. Lou was within five or ten feet when defendant asked where the money 
was and showed his gun. Id. at 75. Lou looked at defendant while Dave Peterson 
went to get Jill. After the group entered the cash control room, Lou helped 
defendant load the money into the gym bags, looking directly at him for about five 
minutes. Id. at 77-78. 
Lou did not assist in preparing the composite, but viewed it later. Id. at 79. 
He did not participate in the photo spread identification, but identified defendant at 
a lineup, indicating that he was "pretty sure, but not definite" that defendant was the 
perpetrator. Id. at 79-81; State's Exhibit 27. Although "shocked" that the robbery 
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was occurring and somewhat nervous, Lou stated that he had been "in the water 
park industry for a long time and dealt with catastrophic type things" and therefore 
wasn't so nervous that he could not "remember who was there or what happened." 
R. 315:85. 
4. Jill Pittman Roberts 
Jill, the cash control manager, first saw defendant when she went to get Lou 
the keys to the cash room. Observing him about ten feet from her, she noted his 
lifeguard type clothing, his stocky build, his dark hair shoved up under his hat, and 
his fake moustache. Id, at 59. She thought his dress was "kind of hilarious." Id, at 
60. She walked right next to him as they approached the cash room and looked 
directly at him for a few seconds. Id. She assumed he had come to work on the 
sprinklers. Id. at 61. She had no indication that anything was wrong until Lou 
asked her to open the vault. Id. 
After realizing that a robbery was in progress, Jill helped Lou fill the first 
gym bag with cash and handed it to defendant. Id. at 63. She again looked at him 
from a distance of eight feet or less. Id. She looked at him a final time before he 
left. Id. at 64. 
Jill saw the composite, but did not view the photo spread. Id. at 64-65. She 
identified defendant at the lineup. Id. at 66; State's Exhibit 27. 
The testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing supported the trial judge's 
determination that, under the totality of the circumstances, the identifications were 
27 
sufficiently reliable to present to the jury. The evidence of reliability is, moreover, 
more favorable than that found sufficient in Ramirez. Defendant has not 
demonstrated that the trial court denied him due process when it refused to suppress 
the identifications. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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Addendum A 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of comnuttxng 
robbe7a)heuses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601* 
(b) causes serious bodily ixyury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
gule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
mne, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as case ruled prejudicial and violation of due pro-
i basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The cess). See the following Utah cases to the same 
engage in language is not one of substance, effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 
go* 'surprise" would be within the concept of P2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v Johns, 615 P2d 
*UI1fair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v Lohner, 641P 2d 93 
also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule (Utah 1982). 
403 indicating that a continuance in most in- Croea References). — Admissibility of evi-
jfcoces would be a more appropriate method of dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
feet to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(bX4), 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah U.R.C.P. 
Roles of Evidence (1971), was substantially the Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter-
as*. mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4. 
Crost-Referencee. — Blood tests to deter- Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
sane parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-45a-7,
 number of expert witneaaes, Rule 16, U R.C P 
Rule 704* Opinion on ultimate i*fue. 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condit on 
0f a defendant in a cnminal case may state an opinion or inference as to 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone, 
/^nended effective October 1, 1992.) 
advisory Committee Note. — This rule is This rule is identical to Rule 704 of the 
.ue federal rule, verbatim, and com porta with Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 1984 
Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). See 
gdwardi v. Didencksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
1979). 
